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LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY: EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY -

JURY BEHAVIOR.

By L. Craig Parker. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas. 1980. Pp.
vii, 185. $22.75.
In Legal Psychology, L. Craig Parker presents an overview of the legal
and psychological concepts of eyewitness testimony and jury behavior. The
author attempts to integrate the discipline of psychology into legal practice
in order to overcome the reluctance of the legal profession to employ psychological concepts. After a brief outline of the other contexts in which
these disciplines interact, Parker examines a large volume of psychological
research pertaining to two discrete areas - eyewitness testimony and jury
behavior. As a complement to these studies, he reviews Supreme Court
decisions relevant to these subjects. Unfortunately, his discussion only infrequently goes beyond this sum'llary format. Parker fails to suggest any
guidelines for the practical application of psychology to the practice oflaw.
Legal Psychology is, consequently, unlikely to have a significant impact on
either psychological or legal literature.
Parker first attempts to provide some background on the interface of
law and psychology. He begins by briefly summarizing the legal-psychological overlap involved in areas ranging from eyewitness testimony to legal
socialization. This is followed by a historical survey of those psychological
studies with legal implications. This somewhat haphazard section leaves
the lay reader overwhelmed, not only by the large number of studies surveyed, but also by their tenuous relevance to the book's subject matter. Although this survey may be of interest to psychologists, it is too unwieldly to
be of use to lawyers. Parker does underscore the undeserved nature of the
legal field's ambivalence towards psychology, but, in general, this overview
of the interface fails to give the lay reader the intended background.
Parker then examines the field of eyewitness testimony in detail. His
thesis throughout is that the present legal rules ignore the research conclusions: judges and juries are insensitive to the inaccuracies that are part of
most eyewitness testimony (p. 30). Parker finds it incongruous that the judiciary continues to stress the weight of eyewitness testimony when both
experimentation and actual mistaken identifications demonstrate that this
testimony is frequently inaccurate.
Parker focuses on the variables that might result in differing eyewitness
testimony for identical situations. Unfortunately, these variables, which
range from race to religion, sex to socioeconomic background, are
presented through an unorganized series of experimental results. 1 Parker
underlines an experimental variable as affecting eyewitness testimony and
applies his talent for criticism to the experiment's methodology. This leaves
the reader confused as to the actual significance of these variables. A section on the importance of these variables and their applicability to the legal
I. One reviewer indicates that Parker's list of experiments was not comprehensive and
omitted studies that had contributed significantly to this particular field. See Wells, Gaps and
Canyons in Psycho-Lego/ Research (Book Review), 27 CONTEMP. PSYCH. 55, 56 (1982).
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issues surrounding eyewitness testimony2 would have been helpful. The
judiciary is unlikely to adopt psychological principles without guidelines
for accurately doing so.
This failure to provide direction is even more apparent in Parker's section on memory testing. The research in this area presents excellent possibilities for practical application in a legal context. Parker surveys studies
ranging from the effect of mug shot displays on memory retention (interference) to tests on the comparative accuracy of identification between artist's
sketches and composite portraits. An experiment on the number of incorrect identifications resulting from the nonverbal cues of the person conducting the trial identification seems, for example, an obvious candidate for
legal implementation. Parker again declines the opportunity to summarize
this psychological data in a way that would indicate a direction for legal
reform.
Parker does attempt, through Supreme Court decisions,3 to illustrate the
legal perspective on eyewitness testimony. He finds that the decisions fluctuate from excellent analyses applying recent psychological studies4 to decisions based solely on intuition.5 A case not discussed by Parker
underscores his frustration with legal rulings. In United States v. Crews 6
the Cou1t, without the benefit of psychological studies, held that a witness'
courtroom identification rested on an independent recollection and was not
the result of illegally obtained pretrial identification.7 The research in this
area, however, indicates that the initial identification becomes a reinforcement for all future identifications. The illegal pretrial identification would
then prejudice the defendant at trial (p. 110). This supports Parker's theme
that the courts often ignore or reject the findings of experimental
psychology.
Yet Parker again fails to provide proposals to remedy the deficiencies.
He points out that the Court has attempted to safeguard defendants by requiring the presence of a lawyer at the identification. The lawyer, however,
is unlikely to know how to protect his client in this situation. Parker
stresses the prejudice and bias which pervades many identifications, but he
fails to provide practical instruction for the lawyer who has a client in a
lineup. Parker merely discusses suggestions, such as videotaped lineups,
made by other commentators without recommending any (pp. 110-15).
Parker thus adds very little to the understanding or prevention of inaccurate eyewitness identifications. Legal commentators have long recognized the unreliability of this sort oftestimony.8 The key legal problem2. Parker has been criticized for failing to discriminate between variables that can be used
in a practical context and those that have only questionable value for those in the legal field.
Id at 56.
3. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); Kirby
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1973); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
4. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-36 (1967).
5. See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977).
6. 44S U.S. 463 (1980).
7. 445 U.S. at 473.
8. See, e.g., E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); E. LOFrUS, EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY (1979); P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965); Le-
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devising procedures to reduce the risks of erroneous identifications without
crippling criminal law enforcement - has already been resourcefully undertaken by other observers.9 The need, therefore, is less for another demonstration that eyewitness testimony is suspect than for the political
determination to do something about it. Parker's book is highly unlikely to
contribute to this last objective.
Parker next examines the research and legal practice on jury decision
rules. After a succinct review of the Supreme Court cases on jury size and
unanimous decisions, 10 Parker again enters the realm of psychological literature.11 He emphasizes that when the courts have used psychological studies in their rationale, they have often relied on research of limited
credibility. Parker does an excellent job of pointing out the weaknesses in
the experiments on jury decision rules. Weaknesses include the homogeneity of the subject sample (frequently college students) as opposed to the
heterogeneous sample required for jury selection, and the inherent differences between deciding a hypothetical case and an actual case. Again, the
thorough criticism of these psychological hypotheses leaves the reader insecure as to their importance. The overall thrust of the results is that the
decisions of a six-person jury and a nonunanimous twelve-person jury may
infringe upon a defendant's rights. Parker stresses, however, that because
of "outstanding weaknesses" these studies are of questionable value to the
judiciary (p. 141). This subject, however, does illustrate the promise of experimental research on legal issues. Parker emphasizes the limitations of
this research without minimizing psychology's potential. The reader is left
with the hope that future research may resolve the lingering uncertainty.
Parker also analyzes some of the research on jury behavior. He divides
his analysis into two sections. First he reviews the studies on nonlegal factors, such as sex, race and status, that can influence jury decisions. Unfortunately, the data generated by these studies seems too piecemeal to
advance knowledge much beyond the intuitive level. Parker's next section,
on the use of social scientists in jury selection, reinforces this skepticism. He
comments on the legal arguments espousing the dangers of stacking the
jury. Parker, however, hesitates to give any credence to the alleged benefits
of experimental psychology to jury selection procedures. Lawyers should
note that in order for psychological techniques to have any significant effect, the psychologist must have an unusually comprehensive background
in this area and the evidence must be sufficiently ambiguous for jury biases
to influence the ultimate decision. Until further developments occur in this
vine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gapftom Wade to Kirby, 121 U.
PA. L. REV. 1079 (1973).
9. See, e.g., Sobel,Assailing the Impermissible Suggestion: Evolving Limitations on the Abuse
of Pre-Trial Criminal Identification Methods, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 261 (1971) (suggesting,
among other things, "blank lineups" - lineups in which the suspect does not initially
participate).
10. Recent cases that Parker does not include in his discussion are Burch v. Louisiana, 441
U.S. 130 (1979) (The Court held that the provisions of the Louisiana Constitution that permitted nonunanimous six-person jury decisions were unconstitutional.), and Brown v. Louisiana,
447 US. 323 (1980) (The Court held that the decision in Burch was retroactive.).
II. Wells suggests that psychologists may find M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS (1977), a more
thorough work on jury behavior. Wells, supra note I, at 56.
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field, Parker suggests that the intuition of the individual lawyer may be just
as productive a tool for jury selection as experimental psychology.
An additional chapter tying these loose ends of psychological research
together would be useful to both lawyers and psychologists. While Parker
bemoans the reluctance of lawyers to use psychology, the reader is left unsure of what Parker feels should be psychology's contribution to the law.
He outlines flaws in the research, but does not deal directly with the concerns of lawyers. A legitimate concern is that psychological studies are
oversimplified and, therefore, are not applicable to real life situations (p.
17). As a summary of recent Supreme Court law and psychological studies,
Parker's presentation is often unorganized. The reader is required to decide
for himself which principles are relevant to the legal problems. The discipline of legal psychology has a vast opportunity for selecting those experimental results that are valid and designing methods of applying them to
legal procedure. A better understanding of legal issues, however, is important to any book hoping to influence psychology's effect on the law. Legal
Psychology fails to address the concerns of lawyers, and hence fails in its
intended goals. 12

12. Parker's book is also reviewed by Wells, supra note 1.

